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The amount of intrinsic randomness that can be extracted from measurement on quantum systems
depends on several factors: notably, the power given to the adversary and the level of characterization
of the devices of the authorized partners. After presenting a systematic introduction to these notions,
in this paper we work in the class of least adversarial power, which is relevant for assessing setups
operated by trusted experimentalists, and compare three levels of characterization of the devices.
Many recent studies have focused on the so-called “device-independent” level, in which a lower
bound on the amount of intrinsic randomness can be certified without any characterization. The
other extreme is the case when all the devices are fully characterized: this “tomographic” level
has been known for a long time. We present for this case a systematic and efficient approach to
quantifying the amount of intrinsic randomness, and show that setups involving ancillas (POVMs,
pointer measurements) may not be interesting here, insofar as one may extract randomness from
the ancilla rather than from the system under study. Finally, we study how much randomness can
be obtained in presence of an intermediate level of characterization related to the task of “steering”,
in which Bob’s device is fully characterized while Alice’s is a black box. We obtain our results here
by adapting the NPA hierarchy of semidefinite programs to the steering scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
The quantum information community has always
duly acknowledged Bell’s work as pioneering. In-
deed, Bell’s discovery [1] that an apparently philo-
sophical issue can actually be settled by experiment
was a precursor to the approach of stopping com-
plaining about quantum weirdness and putting it
to practical use. Once this novel approach was
adopted, however, there seemed to be little scope
left for Bell inequalities: Bell having done its job by
showing that local variables don’t exist, one should
focus on entanglement as a resource. A few authors
tried to find links between Bell inequalities and some
useful tasks, but the reported examples happened to
be either artefacts of restrictive assumptions [2] or
ad hoc constructions [3].
The practical role of Bell inequalities in quantum
information was fully clarified around the year 2007
(see [4, 5] for a review of those developments): the
violation of Bell inequalities witnesses entanglement
without any need to specify the dimensionality of the
system under study or the measurements that are
performed on it. This means that one can certify,
and even more, quantify, the entanglement shared
between two or more black boxes. This possibility,
unique to Bell inequalities, has been called device-
independent certification. The first task to be stud-
ied this way was quantum key distribution [6]; it
was followed by the task of generating certified ran-
domness [7, 8] and by the quantifications of some
entanglement measures [9, 10].
Device-independent certification still requires
some assumptions on the devices, that we are go-
ing to describe in detail in the next section: these
assumptions define the minimal level of characteri-
zation of the devices that is required to be able to
certify some quantum behavior. On the contrary,
the bulk of the quantum information literature usu-
ally works under the assumption that the degrees of
freedom under study (“system”) and the measure-
ments are fully characterized — intriguingly, this
is the case even in quantum cryptography: for in-
stance, the unconditional security of the BB84 pro-
tocol relies on the fact that the systems used by Alice
and Bob are qubits [11]. Between the two extremes,
several semi-device-independent levels of trust can
be relevant.
The goal of this paper is to discuss how the pro-
duction of quantum randomness depends on the level
with which the devices involved are characterized.
Our results will be derived in the minimal adversar-
ial class which is relevant to assess setups produced
and operated by honest experimentalists. We begin
by clarifying all these scenarios (Section II), then we
introduce the mathematical tools (Section III) and
present an explicit comparison between three levels
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of characterization (Section IV). Finally, we high-
light some subtleties proper to randomness extrac-
tion in a scenario of complete characterization of the
system and the measurements (Section V).
II. SCENARIOS FOR QUANTUM
RANDOMNESS
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FIG. 1. Generic setup of quantum randomness extrac-
tion. The authorized party inputs z into a box and re-
ceives the outcome c, whose randomness one wants to
guarantee with respect to an adversary Eve. Inside the
box, the role of z consists in selecting a possible mea-
surement Mz to be performed on a state ρ, and c is the
outcome of that measurement. The assumption of mea-
surement independence (which is enforced here, though
it could be partially relaxed) means that in each run z
and ρ must be uncorrelated. Various scenarios can be
considered based on the power given to Eve (discussed
in paragraph II A) and the level of characterization that
the authorized party has of her devices (paragraph II B).
We start this paper by a concise review of vari-
ous scenarios for quantum randomness. The generic
setup for quantum randomness is sketched in Fig. 1.
As explained in the caption, the goal of the autho-
rized party is to certify the randomness of the out-
come c with respect to Eve’s knowledge. There is a
priori place for a third party, the provider, who may
have produced some of the devices but has no inter-
est in learning c. A scenario will be defined by the
power given to Eve and the level of characterization
of the devices. We address them in this order.
For definiteness, we focus exclusively on the case
of measurement independence: namely, we assume
that the state to be measured ρ and the choice of
the measurement z are fully uncorrelated in each
run. It is remarkable that even this assumption can
be partially relaxed, giving rise to the possibility of
randomness amplification [12–19], but we don’t con-
sider this task in this paper.
A. Classes of adversarial power
Throughout the paper, we are going to as-
sume that quantum theory holds; in particular,
we don’t discuss the possibility of certifying ran-
domness against an adversary limited only by no-
signaling [12, 14–16, 20, 21]. The power given to
Eve can be divided in three main classes:
Class (I) Eve has no access to the devices. Because of
the Kerchhoff-Shannon principle (one should
not look for security in hiding details of the
hardware or the protocol), we assume that
even though she cannot influence it, Eve has
knowledge of the experimental setup. Thus, she
may know in each run which quantum state en-
ters the box, and which measurement is used.
Her description of both state and measure-
ments may be better than that of both Al-
ice and the provider: for instance, she may
be able to describe the state as pure in each
run by knowing which decomposition of a pos-
sible mixture is being used. Since the choice
of measurement in each run is known to Eve,
no initial private randomness is required here.
We can define two subclasses, according to
whether Eve does not (a) or does (b) hold a pu-
rification of the state in a quantum memory (in
the literature on quantum cryptography one
finds also intermediate situations between (a)
and (b), the so-called bounded-storage mod-
els [22] and noisy storage models [23]). Be-
cause quantum theory is no-signaling, holding
a purification does not allow Eve to change the
state ρ, but may give her more guessing power
since she will be able to steer towards a spe-
cific decomposition (by performing a specific
measurement on her reduced state).
Class (II) Eve distributes the state to the users, but
has only classical, though perfect, knowledge
about the set of possible measurements. Note
that in this case, the measurement settings
should not be known by Eve in advance, other-
wise she could prepare the state accordingly to
obtain full knowledge of the outcomes. Thus,
an initial amount of private randomness is nec-
essary to run the protocol. We can again define
subclasses (a) and (b) as above. Class II(b)
is a natural analog of the entanglement-based
scheme in which quantum cryptography can be
proven “unconditional secure”: as such, most
papers on quantum randomness have consid-
ered it [21, 24–26]. This class is natural in the
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Class I Class II Class III
Eve... has no access to the devices distributes the state prepares the devices
Subclass (a) randomness
holds classical side information generation randomness no
expansion randomness
Subclass (b) randomness
holds quantum side information generation
TABLE I. Randomness protocols in presence of measurement independence with different classes of adversaries. The
gray cell corresponds to the trusted provider assumption, which describes the class of adversaries considered in this
work.
case where Alice holds two subsystems situ-
ated in secured, but possibly distant locations.
Class (III) The maximal class is that in which Eve is
the provider, namely she prepares both the
measurement devices and the state: the only
power left with Alice is the choice of z in each
run. The claim is frequently made, at least in
semi-popular accounts, that quantum physics
could provide security against an adversarial
provider. The correct statement is that one
may be able to certify the quantumness of the
process that generates c, typically in the case
of a loophole-free Bell test. However, an ad-
versarial provider would certainly find a way
to hide a transmitter in the devices, with the
task of leaking out the values of c at the end of
the protocol, or may employ attacks discussed
in [27]. Therefore, however certifiably quan-
tum the process that generated the outcomes
may have been, there cannot be any random-
ness with respect to an adversarial provider.
So we won’t consider this class any longer in
this paper.
A point worth stressing is the amount of random-
ness needed to generate the seed z. The choice of this
seed must indeed guarantee measurement indepen-
dence, i.e. z must be “random” with respect to the
choice of the state in each run, and viceversa; while
the randomness we want to extract must be unpre-
dictable for Eve. Therefore, if one works in Class I,
no randomness with respect to Eve is required in the
input seed: even if Eve knows z, she cannot adapt
the state to it. Similarly, the random seed needed
to extract the final random bits from the output c
through the left-over hash lemma needs only be ran-
dom with respect to the outputs themselves. It can
thus be known to the adversary. One can then speak
of randomness generation [28]. On the contrary, in
Classe II, since Eve prepares the state, the inputs
z must be generated with a process that is a priori
guaranteed to be unknown to Eve. In other words,
in these classes there is no randomness generation,
but only randomness expansion — and, after a series
of partial results [24, 28, 29], it has been proved that
such expansion can in principle be unbounded [21].
The different adversarial classes discussed here are
summarized in Table I.
Finally recall that we are assuming strict mea-
surement independence. If partial measurement de-
pendence is taken into account, one would have to
refine the definition of these classes: for instance,
by specifying whether the dependence is introduced
unwittingly by the provider or maliciously by Eve.
B. Levels of characterization of the devices
The second defining feature of a scenario is the
level of characterization that Alice has of the work-
ing of her devices. We sketched it in the introduc-
tion, now we can be more precise:
• The tomography level of characterization usu-
ally means that Alice knows the behavior of
her devices as well as Eve does. This is what
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we shall consider in this paper. Of course, in
the vast literature on quantum tomography,
the possibility of partial knowledge of the de-
vices has been considered [30–33], so one could
refine this level of characterization in several
sublevels. In all cases, though, it is assumed
that Alice knows exactly which degrees of free-
dom are relevant to the measurement (polar-
ization, spin, quadrature of a field...).
When this trust in the characterization is un-
warranted, a Class II Eve may successfully
hack the devices. In particular, Eve may know
that some degrees of freedom, others than the
ones Alice is aware of, play a role in the physi-
cal process, and may thus influence the behav-
ior of the boxes by addressing those degrees
of freedom. For instance, this was the case in
the series of experiments that hacked quantum
cryptography devices by exploiting the physics
of photodetectors [34–36]. Similarly, a Class
I Eve could also take advantage of her knowl-
edge about what happens in additional degrees
of freedom if a setup happens to use them.
• The device-independent level of characteriza-
tion means that Alice does not rely on a
description of her devices but only on the
observed statistics. Since the statistics on
a single quantum system can always be re-
produced with classical randomness, device-
independence requires a loophole-free violation
of a Bell inequality. Specifically, it is crucial
to close the detection loophole, while the no-
signaling condition may be justified in other
ways than by arranging spacelike separation.
In any case, Alice may actually hold both mea-
surement devices in her lab. Nevertheless, for
convenience we shall speak of Alice and Bob
when it comes to device-independence. We
also note that, as it happens for measurement
independence, the strict no-signaling condition
may be partially relaxed, but we don’t consider
this relaxation in this paper [37].
• One can define intermediate levels of charac-
terization, collectively known as semi-device-
independent. For instance, in the con-
text of quantum cryptography, the idea
of measurement-device-independence has been
put forward after noting that hacking usually
involves detectors (which are therefore bet-
ter left untrusted) rather than sources (which
may therefore be trusted) [38]. Other works
relax the tomographic requirement of perfect
knowledge of the degree of freedom, but as-
sume an upper bound on the dimensionality
of the systems under study [39]. In this pa-
per, we shall consider explicitly the case called
one-sided device-independent, in which entan-
glement is certified by two devices, Alice’s be-
ing tomographic and Bob’s unknown; this case
was studied for quantum key distribution [40].
C. Assumptions of this paper
In this paper, we consider Eve in Class I(a), which
was called “trusted provider” in previous works [41].
In real life, this class describes randomness genera-
tion in an experiment performed by a trusted labo-
ratory: therefore, even if it does not explore the ulti-
mate limits of quantum power, it is arguably relevant
for physics [42, 43]. The randomness is guaranteed
against any Eve that is not involved in setting up
or running the experiment. Furthermore, Eve not
being in the lab, she could hold the purification only
if those degrees of freedom were “radiative” and she
had the power to collect them: this, together with
the state-of-the-art of quantum memories, makes it
very reasonable to restrict to subclass (a) at least for
a few years to come.
Also, we consider only the asymptotic limit of in-
finitely many runs where each run is assumed to be
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) ac-
cording to some strategy of Eve. Corrections due
to finite samples, and extension to non-i.i.d. scenar-
ios can in principle be done with the techniques in
[28, 44, 45].
III. COMPUTING RANDOMNESS FOR
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF
CHARACTERIZATION
A. Definitions and notation
Let us introduce the basic notions to study ran-
domness (cf. [46]). The authorized party can in-
put z ∈ {1, ...,m} in the box and obtain output
c ∈ {1, ..., d} (see Fig. 1). In the asymptotic limit of
infinitely many runs, she can reconstruct the statis-
tics P (c|z). This statistical distribution may reflect
either accidental randomness (due to ignorance of
some details of the state or the device) or intrinsic
randomness, due to the unpredictability of the out-
come of quantum measurements. We are interested
in the latter because for Eve, in any of the Classes
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defined above, there is no accidental randomness.
In this section, the states |ψ〉 or ρ refer to every-
thing that is in the box, so that the measurements
can be assumed to be projective. When the box
is fully characterized, it becomes possible to distin-
guish between the system and a possible ancilla, i.e.
to discuss the case of POVMs as distinct. We do
this in section V B.
If the state is pure, there is no accidental random-
ness for von Neumann measurements. Then, the
randomness of c obtained from a given z is quanti-
fied by the probability G(|ψ〉, z) of guessing the out-
come correctly. Since the best strategy for guessing
is to guess the most probable outcome, this guessing
probability is
G(|ψ〉, z) = max
c
P (c|z, |ψ〉). (1)
If the state shared by Alice and Bob is mixed, we
have to separate the intrinsic randomness from the
accidental one. For measurement z, the average
guessing probability that quantifies intrinsic ran-
domness is then given by
G(ρ, z) = max
{qλ,ψλ}
∑
λ
qλG(|ψλ〉, z), (2)
where ρ =
∑
λ qλ|ψλ〉〈ψλ|, and the maximization is
taken over all possible such decompositions.
For the device-independent level of characteriza-
tion, Alice cannot write down a quantum state but
needs to use only the observed probability distribu-
tion P . Then the guessing probability that quanti-
fies intrinsic randomness is
G(P, z) = max
(ρ,M)→P
G(ρ, z), (3)
where the maximization is taken over all quantum
states ρ and measurements M compatible with the
probability distribution P .
In all these cases, the number of random bits that
can be extracted per run is quantified by the min-
entropy
Hmin(G) = − log2G . (4)
Finally, one may consider extracting randomness
out of several settings, rather than a single one. If
Eve is allowed to keep a purification of the state [sub-
classes (b)], upon learning which settings have been
used in a given run, she may be able to steer the
state to the decomposition that maximizes (2) for
those settings [47]. If Eve does not hold a purifica-
tion [subclasses (a)], however, using several settings
is known to be advantageous [41].
Now we are going to explain how randomness
can be computed in each of the three levels of
characterization of our concern. For the device-
independent level of characterization, randomness
generation against a Class Ia Eve have been pre-
sented in [41, 48], so we don’t repeat this here.
B. Tomography level of characterization
For the case of tomography level of characteriza-
tion, we are on a ground familiar for most physicists.
If a qubit is prepared in the state |+ z〉, to say that a
measurement of σx provides a perfect random bit is
just a rephrasing of elementary textbook knowledge.
The example of a qubit prepared in the maximally
mixed state 1/2 is only slightly more involved: then,
a measurement of a single observable (say) σx does
not guarantee any randomness, because the state
may have been prepared by mixing eigenstates of
that operator, in which case Eve would have full
knowledge of the outcome of each run. However,
the uncertainty relations provide a way around it: if
in each run Alice can choose to measure either σx
or σz, no preparation can be an eigenstate of both,
therefore there is randomness with respect to Eve as
long as she does not hold a purification (see [49] for
how uncertainty relations must be modified if Eve
does hold a purification).
Now we provide a general recipe to compute the
intrinsic randomness for projective measurements;
the case of POVMs will be discussed in paragraph
V B.
Since the state ρ can be reconstructed and is there-
fore part of the observed data, we need to perform
the maximization of Eq. (2). In the decomposition,
it is not a priori obvious how many quantum states
|ψλ〉 are to be considered. Fortunately, the argu-
ment used in [41] can be transposed directly from
probability distributions to density matrices. In a
nutshell, all the lambdas for which the inner max-
imization is achieved by the same argument c can
be grouped together into a unique lambda (which is
relabeled as c). Thus, it is sufficient to consider one
state per outcome.
Therefore, for a projective measurement M ≡
{Πc, c = 1, ..., d} with d outcomes, one has to solve
G(ρ,M) = max
{ρc}
∑
c
Tr
[
ρcΠc
]
(5)
under the constraints that ρ =
∑
c ρc, ρc ≥ 0. Like
in the case of device-independence, this maximiza-
tion is a semi-definite program (SDP), the only dif-
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ference being that the matrix that must be posi-
tive is the quantum state itself, not a matrix of mo-
menta of the observed statistics. Moreover, here the
SDP solves the problem of interest directly, rather
than a relaxation thereof. Given the tomography
level of characterization, Alice can choose to extract
randomness from any measurement, and will choose
that for which the guessing probability in (5) is the
lowest. Hence, for a given state ρ,
G(ρ) = min
M
G(ρ,M) [one measurement]. (6)
Further, when Eve is not allowed to hold a purifica-
tion, it may be advantageous to extract randomness
from more measurements. If setting Mz is chosen
with probability qz, the average guessing probabil-
ity will be
G(ρ, {Mz}z) = max{ρC}
∑
C
m∑
z=1
qz Tr
[
ρCΠ
z
cz
]
= max
{ρC}
∑
C
Tr
[
ρCMC
]
, (7)
where we have denotedMC =
∑m
z=1 qzΠ
z
cz ; the con-
straints are as above, and now C = (c1, c2, ..., cm),
so the maximization now involves a decomposition
on dm states. The fact that Eve cannot steer Al-
ice’s mixture is explicit in that the decomposition
ρ =
∑
C ρC is independent of z. As above, Alice
is allowed to choose the set of measurements that
minimizes the guessing probability, so
G(ρ) = min
{Mz}
G(ρ, {Mz}) [more measurements].(8)
Notice that unlike the optimization (7) which is an
SDP, this last optimization over the choices of mea-
surement settings is not a SDP.
C. One-sided device-independent level of
characterization
The one-sided device-independent level of charac-
terization, to our knowledge, has never been consid-
ered before in the context of randomness. The sce-
nario is very similar to steering [50, 51]: the setup is
actually the same, but the figure of merit is different.
Indeed, instead of having Alice to convince Bob that
she can steer his state, we just let them perform their
measurements locally and ask whether randomness
can be extracted from their outcomes.
Like before, we consider first the amount of ran-
dom bits that can be extracted from the outcomes
c = (a, b) of a single pair of measurements z = (x, y)
with Ax = {Πxa} and By = {Πyb} denoting Alice and
Bob’s local measurements. The guessing probability
is analog to (3) and given by
G(P, z) = max
(ρ,Ax,By)→P
G(ρ,Ax, By)
= max
(ρc,Ax,By)→P
∑
c
Pc(c|z) (9)
where ρ =
∑
c ρc, and Pc(a, b|x, y) = Tr(ρcΠxa ⊗
Πyb ). The constraints for the optimization are the
observed statistics P (a, b|x, y), and the knowledge
of the state and measurements on Bob’s side.
Such optimization is very similar to the one used
for the device-independent level of characterization
in [41, 48], where one can use the hierarchy intro-
duced in [52] to provide upper bounds. In that
case, from the set of local measurements and de-
pending on the hierarchy’s level, one forms a cer-
tain matrix Γc whose elements are expectation val-
ues with ρc of products of operators of the form:
〈MA⊗1〉, 〈1⊗MB〉, 〈MA⊗MB〉, 〈MAM ′A⊗1〉, 〈1⊗
MBM
′
B〉, 〈MAM ′A ⊗MBM ′B〉, etc, where MA,M ′A,
and MB ,M
′
B are operators from the set of Alice’s
and Bob’s local measurements (union the identity),
respectively (see [52] for a detailed description of
this matrix). Some elements of Γc are related to
the Pc(a, b|x, y) mentioned above, while others are
extra unknown variables in the optimization. By
constraining Γc to be positive semi-definite and the
sum over c of Pc(a, b|x, y) to be the observed statis-
tics, one can bound the guessing probability in the
device-independent level of characterization.
Now in the one-sided device-independent case, we
impose further constraints on the elements of Γc
based on the knowledge of Bob’s measurements.
Namely, we use the algebraic relations satisfied by
these operators to constraint the moments of Γc
which involve them. For instance, if B3 = (B1 +
B2)/
√
2 or B1B2 = −B2B1, the relations 〈OB3〉 =
(〈OB1〉+ 〈OB2〉)/
√
2 or 〈OB1B2〉 = −〈OB2B1〉 are
imposed for all product of operators O. This re-
duces the number of independent variables in the
optimization. These relations are imposed on each c
in (9), as they should hold for each of the ρc in the
decomposition. Note that we do not directly use the
knowledge of Bob’s local state to further constraint
the optimization. We thus obtain an upper bound
on the guessing probability.
Just like in the other levels of characterization,
one could consider extracting randomness from more
than one measurement here, if Eve does not hold a
purification of the measured state. The optimization
problem can be set up in a manner analogous to
what we have been considering.
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IV. COMPARISON OF THE YIELDS OF
THREE LEVELS OF CHARACTERIZATION
In order to compare the yields of the various levels
of characterization, we need a common set of data.
We assume that the data come from measuring a
two-qubit Werner state ρV = V |Φ+〉〈Φ+| + (1 −
V )1/4; Alice measures either A1 = σx or A2 = σz,
Bob measures one of the four B1 = σx, B2 = σz,
B3 = σ+ or B4 = σ− with σ± = (σx ± σz)/
√
2.
These measurements can lead to non-trivial assess-
ment for all the level of characterization we are in-
terested in. Indeed, (A1, A2;B1, B2) can be used for
partial tomography and identify |Φ+〉 uniquely when
V = 1; for device-independence, (A1, A2;B3, B4) vi-
olate the CHSH inequality for V > 1/
√
2 and cer-
tify |Φ+〉 for V = 1 because CHSH = 2√2 [53]; for
one-sided device-independence, a similar argument
holds for (A1, A2;B1, B2) and the steering inequal-
ity S2 defined in [54]. Anyway, in what follows, the
amount of randomness is computed directly from the
observed statistics, without processing them into a
specific tomography protocol or inequality.
As mentioned before, we focus on the random-
ness generated by a single pair of setting. In the
device-independent case, we bound the amount of
random bits using the second level of the hierar-
chy [52], as described in (3) (see [41, 48] for more
details). For the one-sided device-independent case,
we use the method described in section III C at the
same level of the hierarchy, together with the al-
gebraic relations generated by Bob’s measurements
(including B3 = (B1 +B2)/
√
2, B4 = (B1−B2)/
√
2,
B1B2 = −B2B1, B3B4 = −B4B3, etc.). Finally,
for tomography characterization, we compute the
amount of randomness based on (7), as explained
in section III B.
The main result we obtained for three different
levels of characterization is shown in Fig. 2. As ex-
pected, for any visibility V the amount of random-
ness increases with the level of characterization of
the devices, with the tomographic level giving the
largest amount of randomness.
Note that for all three different levels of charac-
terization, two bits of randomness can be extracted
when V = 1. In the device-independent case, this is
more randomness than the ∼ 1.23 bits that can be
certified from the maximal violation of the CHSH in-
equality [7]. To understand this difference, we com-
pare the amount of randomness that can be certified
in this scenario from different constraints.
Namely, we consider the randomness that can be
certified from the correlations above, the one that
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FIG. 2. Amount of randomness extracted Hmin from the
outcomes of the setting pair A2, B1 from three different
levels of characterizations.
is certified from an optimal violation of the CHSH
inequality
CHSH = 〈A1B1〉+ 〈A1B2〉+ 〈A2B1〉 − 〈A2B2〉 ≤ 2
(10)
with the same state, and from a optimal violation of
a modified CHSH inequality
CHSH3 = 〈A1B1〉+ 〈A1B2〉+ 〈A2B1〉
−〈A2B2〉+ 〈A1B3〉 ≤ 3 . (11)
These last two computations are performed by fixing
the value of the inequality rather than the value of
the correlations in the corresponding SDP. The re-
sult is shown in Fig. 3: 2 bits of randomness can be
extracted indeed from CHSH3 when the pair of per-
fectly uncorrelated measurements ZA, XB are used.
However, no such measurements are available when
CHSH is maximally violated.
Note also that in Fig. 2 and 3, randomness can be
extracted in the device-independent case only pro-
vided that a Bell inequality is violated, i.e. when
V < 1/
√
2 for CHSH and V = 3/(2
√
2 + 1) ≈ 0.78
for CHSH3. In other words, no randomness is found
when a local hidden variable model can produce the
observed correlations.
In the one-sided device-independent case, how-
ever, randomness can be extracted from all Werner
state, except the completely mixed state. Yet, it is
known that Werner states are non-steerable for V ≤
0.5 [50], i.e. such states admit a Local Hidden State
(LHS) model. Thus, our result shows that one can
certify randomness in one-sided device-independent
context even in presence of a LHS model.
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FIG. 3. The amount of randomness computed with dif-
ferent constraints: CHSH, CHSH3, and full observed
statistics. Hmin of CHSH corresponds to the setting pair
A2, B3, while others correspond to A2, B1.
This can be understood by the fact that a local
hidden state model only ascribes fixed outcomes to
the measurement of one party. The other one, Bob in
our case, receives a quantum state to measure. How-
ever, Bob enjoys in this context a tomographic level
of characterization of his system. He can thus al-
ways extract some randomness from this state. This
is the case unless all the quantum states given to
Bob can all be chosen in the same basis, as possible
when V = 0.
Note that randomness can be extracted for all V >
0 in the tomographic level of trust as well. However
the randomness also disappears there when V = 0,
i.e. when the Werner state is white noise. In the next
section, we discuss how randomness can be extracted
from the white noise by using several measurement
settings.
V. MORE RESULTS ON THE
TOMOGRAPHIC LEVEL OF
CHARACTERIZATION
A. Randomness from single-qubit white noise
and uncertainty relations
Among the many possible illustrations of ran-
domness in the tomographic level of characteriza-
tion, we consider the case of randomness extraction
from a single qubit in the maximally mixed state
ρ = 1/2, against an adversary of Class I(a). We
recover known results on uncertainty relations and
show numerical evidence for more general situations.
As mentioned at the beginning of paragraph III B,
for a single measurement [Eq. (6)] one has G(1/2) =
0: for whatever measurement being performed be-
ing performed, the mixture may have been prepared
by mixing the two eigenstates of the measurement
and this information could be available to Eve. So
to bound the guessing capability of Eve, we need
to consider more than one measurements. We thus
refer to Eqs (7) and (8) from now onwards.
Let us denote {Mk}k=1,...,N the N projective mea-
surements: for any string of values C = (c1, ..., cN ) ∈
{−1,+1}N , the effective measurement operator is
MC = 1 + ~nC · ~σ
2
with ~nC =
N∑
k=1
qk ck ~nk . (12)
With this notation, we have
G(1/2, {Mk}) = 1 + maxC |~nC |
2
. (13)
Indeed, the r.h.s. is obviously an upper bound,
since it is the largest of the eigenvalues; and
it can be achieved by the decomposition 1/2 =
1
2 |+ ~nC¯〉〈+~nC¯ |+ 12 | − ~nC¯〉〈−~nC¯ | where C¯ is defined
by |~nC¯ | = maxC |~nC |. Finally, we are allowed to
choose the N most favorable measurements, i.e.
Eq. (8) becomes G(1/2, N) = 1+gN2 for
gN ≡ min{Mk,qk}maxC |~nC | . (14)
Now, since |~nk| = 1, we have
|~nC |2 =
∑
k
q2k +
∑
k 6=k′
(ckqk~nk) · (ck′qk′~nk′) . (15)
Notice that the second term can always be made
non-negative by the maximization over C. Indeed,
it follows from∑
c1,...,cN
∑
k 6=k′
(ckqk~nk) · (ck′qk′~nk′) = 0 (16)
that maxC
∑
k 6=k′(ckqk~nk) · (ck′qk′~nk′) ≥ 0. There-
fore, in the minimization, the best choice would con-
sist in choosing all the vectors mutually orthogonal,
but this is possible only for N = 2, 3. In these
cases, it is simple to finish the optimization: we find
g2 = 1/
√
2 ≈ 0.7071 and g3 = 1/
√
3 ≈ 0.5774.
Notice that, translated in min-entropy, the case
for N = 2 bound saturates the uncertainty rela-
tion for two min-entropies, Eq. (9) of [55], namely
Hmin(σz) +Hmin(σx) ≥ log( 1+1/
√
2
2 ).
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To go further, we resort to numerical optimiza-
tion to obtain upper bounds on gN . For N = 4,
the optimal choice of measurements is found to be
{(σz, 1−3q), (σ1, q), (σ2, q), (−σ3, q)} where the vec-
tors ~n1,2,3 are 120 degrees apart from each other in
the x−y plane; knowing this geometry, one can finish
the optimization analytically to find g4 =
√
4/13 ≈
0.5547 for q = 3/13. For N = 5 and N = 6, we find
g5 ≈ 0.5422 and g6 ≈ 0.5270. This trend suggests
that, when N → ∞, one has gN → 12 ; we checked
that this would be the case if the optimal choice
would consist in spreading the ~nk uniformly in the
half-sphere.
B. Randomness from POVMs
As we have just seen and also mentioned in para-
graph III B, no randomness can be extracted from
a single projective measurement on the maximally
mixed state, because Eve may know the decom-
position in the eigenvalues of that measurement.
The reasoning does not seem to apply to POVMs,
though: even knowing a pure state, in general Eve
cannot guess with certainty the outcome of a non-
projective POVM. Is it therefore possible to extract
randomness from a single POVM on the maximally
mixed state? The answer is, yes, but the origin of
the randomness makes the problem trivial. Indeed,
because of Neumark’s theorem, a POVM is noth-
ing else than a projective measurement on the sys-
tem and some additional degrees of freedom. We
are going to show that a POVM on the maximally
mixed state cannot provide more randomness than
that present in the ancilla — thence it is pointless
to perform the POVM for randomness purposes, one
could have measured the ancilla directly.
To see this, let us first denote the system’s di-
mensions by ds. The n-outcomes POVM elemenets
are written as {Πc}c=1,...,n. Given that the state we
have is white noise, the probability for Eve to guess
the outcomes correctly is
G(1/ds, {Πc})
= max
{qc,|ψc〉}
n∑
c=1
qc Tr
[
ρcΠc
]
(17)
where 1/ds =
∑
c qcρc and, as previously, ρc
groups all the states in the decomposition for which
maxc′ Tr[ρΠc′ ] = Tr[ρΠc]. Since the maximization
in Equation (17) is taken over all possible decompo-
sition, any specific decomposition provides a lower
bound. In particular, we can choose
ρc =
Πc
Tr
[
Πc
] , qc = Tr [Πc]
ds
(18)
which indeed gives
∑
c qcρc = 1/ds. Then
G(1/ds, {Πc})
≥
n∑
c=1
Tr
[
Πc
]
ds
Tr
[
Πc
Tr[Πc]
Πc
]
=
n∑
c=1
1
ds
Tr
[
Π2c
]
. (19)
Each Πc can be written as its spectral decomposition
Πc =
rc∑
k=1
µc,k|kc〉〈kc| (20)
where rc = rank(Πc) and µc,k are the eigenvalues
of Πc, with |kc〉〈kc| to be the corresponding projec-
tor. Substituting the spectral decomposition into
Eq. (19) gives
n∑
c=1
1
ds
Tr
[
Π2c
]
=
1
ds
n∑
c=1
rc∑
k=1
µ2c,k (21)
But using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have[ n∑
c=1
rc∑
k=1
µ2k,c
][ n∑
c=1
rc∑
k=1
12
]
≥
[ n∑
c=1
rc∑
k=1
µc,k
]2
that is,
n∑
c=1
rc∑
k=1
µ2c,k ≥
d2s∑n
c=1 rc
, (22)
because
∑n
c=1
∑rc
k=1 µc,k =
∑n
c=1 Tr
(
Πk
)
= ds. By
substituting this inequality into Eq. (21), we find
finally the following lower bound on the guessing
probability:
G(1/ds, {Πc}) ≥ ds∑n
c=1 rc
(23)
that is, the upper bound on the min-entropy
Hmin(1/ds, {Πc}) ≤ log(
∑
c
rc)− log ds . (24)
In the tensor product implementation of the POVM,
which uses an ancilla of dimension da, we have∑
c rc = ds da; whence the maximum min-entropy
is log da, which comes solely from the ancilla. In
the direct sum implementation,
∑
c rc = ds + dh is
9
the minimum total dimension (system + hidden sub-
space) required to implement the POVM [56]: since
log(ds + dh) ≤ log ds + log dh, the min-entropy is
upper bounded by log dh. In both cases, we have
proved our claim: all the randomness that can be
obtained in a POVM on the maximally mixed state
can be ascribed to the additional degrees of freedom
used to implement the POVM. Finally notice that,
as far as our proof goes, this conclusion applies only
when the system is in the maximally mixed state:
it remains an open problem whether, in other cases,
POVMs may extract more randomness from the sys-
tem than projective measurements.
C. Randomness from pointer measurements
The previous observation on POVMs extends to
another case in which additional degrees of freedom
are used: that of measurement by coupling the rele-
vant degree of freedom to a pointer. The best known
textbook example is the Stern-Gerlach experiment.
More common nowadays is the measurement of the
polarization of a photon: the photon is sent on a po-
larizing beam-splitter (PBS), the two output ports
of which are correlated with orthogonal polariza-
tions. It is by detecting in which beam the photon
is (pointer) that polarization is inferred. Now, if one
sets up an experiment to extract randomness from
the polarization qubit [57, 58], the same setup pro-
vides another degree of freedom, whose state must be
very close to pure if the measurement has to make
sense at all: indeed, the beam must come from a
well-defined direction for the PBS to work as ex-
pected. Thence, in principle one can extract more
randomness by ignoring polarization and sending the
photon on a normal beam-splitter [59, 60]. We stress
that this argument bears on the amount of random-
ness and on simplicity “on paper”: polarization may
be preferable to deal with other practical concerns
[57].
For other qubits, things may be more subtle. Con-
sider for instance the probing of an atomic qubit
with a laser beam: a laser beam alone can be used to
generate randomness [61], but with a different detec-
tion scheme than the one used in probing atomic ex-
citations; so it may not be immediate to suggest that
one should ignore the atom and extract randomness
directly from the laser. For yet other pointer mea-
surements, it may not even be feasible to measure
the pointer in a complementary basis (certainly it
would be challenging for the Stern-Gerlach setup).
It is not our aim to propose concrete schemes to
extract randomness at the tomography level of char-
acterization. Rather, the bottom-line message could
be put this way: whenever a quantum degree of free-
dom is measured by coupling it to a pointer, the
pointer is usually in a well-defined quantum state.
So, if the goal is to extract randomness, it is worth
considering the possibility of getting it directly from
the pointer.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have quantified the randomness
that can be extracted from a given quantum de-
vice with the device-independent, one-sided device-
independent, and tomographic level of characteriza-
tion. Specific tools were introduced to perform this
quantification in the one-sided device-independent
and tomographic cases. For the latter, we have also
shown that not all conceivable procedures to extract
randomness are actually relevant: in particular one
must be careful whenever ancillas are involved since
the randomness may just come from them rather
than from the system under study. We have fo-
cused on the minimal class of adversarial power, rele-
vant for the study of implementations performed by
trusted experimentalists; a similar study could be
conducted for randomness extraction against more
powerful adversaries.
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